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Summary  findings
India's trade policy  regimrre  has changed  dramatically  *  The gap between  domestic  and export profitability
since  July 1991. The objective  of reform has been to  increased  in the period of the dual exchange  rate regime,
improve  export performance  by improving  export  meaning  that domestic  sales,  already more  attractive  than
incentives  and eliminating  discretionary  controls.  export sales,  became  even more so.
Using  a simple model, Kathuria  sets  out to examine  *  This adverse  movement in export incentives  was
whether export incentives  actually  improved  as a result  revcrsed  with unification  of the exchange  rate in March
of policy  changes.  One part of the two-part modcl  1993.
compares  export profitability  across  regimes.  The other  Overall,  the regime  has moved  closer  to its eventual
compares  the gap between  domestic  and export  goal of being neutral about import substitution  and
profitability  across  regimes.  The export base  is divided  cxport promotion,  which is reflected  in a significant
into eight subsectors,  and several  simulation  exercises  are  ch,mge  in the attitude of India's corporate sector toward
applied to each of them.  exports.
The main results:  It is more than a coincidence  that the export surge in
* For most export sectors,  export profitability  was  fiscal  1993-94 was led mainly  by the sectors  that
lower  under the dual exchange  rate  regime  (March 1992-  witnessed  the greatest increase  in export profitability.
February  1993)  than in the period  before  July 1991.
This paper -a  product of South  Asia,  Country DepartnientIt, Resident  Mission  in India-is  part of a  larger effort in the
department  to monitor economic  developments  in India and to assess  their significance.  Copies  of the paper are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Mona Haddad, room G3-113,
extension  32160 (31 pages).  September  1994.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the cornerstones of India's development policy has been an import - substituting
industrialization  strategy.  It was accompanied  by a heavy dose of export pessimism, which was
reinforced by the poor export performance in the early years of planned development. Owing
to shortage of foreign reserves, trade and industrial  policies  were dominated  by an overwhelming
concern for the likely impact of such policies on the balance of payments.  Not surprisingly,
effective protection rates for domestic  production were much higher than for export production.
This apart, domestic  production was also protected  by severe quantitative  restrictions  on imports.
An  improvement in  the balance of  payments in  the  latter half of  the  1970s saw the
beginnings of a gradual easing of the trade regime.  Export promotion policies took on a new
urgency,  especially in the  1980s, and were rewarded by a significant increase in the export
growth rate  in the  second half of  the decade.  Nevertheless, the totality of policies were
unlikely to yield a sustained growth of exports, as we shall see below.
It is well known that export profitability is a key determinant of export success. 3 Inspite
of the export promotion drive in the 1980s, profitability in the heavily  protected domestic market
' Connmnts on an earlier draft were received from colleagues  at a seminar organized  at the World Bank in New Delhi in December 1992.
These, alongwith  very useful commenls  and suggestions  from Ponab Sen, Fahrettin Yagci. MVansoor  Dailami and Helena  Tang are gratefully
acknowledged.  I would also like to thank  the participants  at the Indian  Econometric  Society  Annual  Conference  in May 1994  for their comments.
I Apart from specifi  export promotion  resources,  there has been. since the mid 19SOs,  a steady  decline in the REER of the mupee,  from 98 in
1985  to 69 in 1990  (1980 =  100). according  to one computation  by H.K. Pradhan (1992). In another study, G. Pradhan (1991)  finds that in
a bLge number of products. such as refrigerators,  sewing  machines,  ceiling fans, motor cars and buses, electric lamps, air conditioners,  paints
and varnishes, woollen  yams and leather and coir products, the growth  in fob price of exports  (unit value of exports)  over 1982487  and 1985-87
and 1987-89  exceeded  the growth in the domestic  price. Thus, we could  associate  a decline  in the REER with increasing  export profitability.
' An ICICI (1985) study found, in a survey  of 79 Indian  companies,  that availability  of export incentives,  recession  in the domestic  market, and
favorable  f.o.b. realizations.  in that order, were the three most important  motivating  factors for exports.
Iremained significantly  higher than profitability  in the export market. 4 Also, policies  were such
that export incentives  relied  primarily  on product-specific  rebates  and import  entitlement  licenses
which were marketable at a premium.  Moreover, export promotion policies involved a
significant drain on budgetary resources, and were unlikely to be sustainable  in a post-reform
regime that required severe fiscal tightening. The main objective  of the trade and exchange  rate
policies introduced since  July 1991  was to enhance  export profitability  and eventually  eliminate
the difference between domestic and export profitability.'  Alongwith  this, budgetary support
to exports was drastically reduced. The emphasis  also shifted from product-specific  incentives
to  more generalized incentives based primarily on the  exchange rate.  The r±al effective
exchange (REER) of the rupee declined  from 54 in the first half of 1991  to 44 in fte second half
of the year (1980=100) owing to the devaluation  of July 1991. By April 1993, the REER had
declined further to 39°.
The objective  of this paper is to judge whether  export incentives  have in fact improved  after
the reforms.  This cannot be done merely by looking  at the REER at different points of time,
since the REER does not take into account  specific export incentives. In fact, some  exporters
claim that it was on account  of these specific incentives  that exports were more profitable for
them in the pre-reform  regime. In order to judge this, therefore, what is required is to constiuct
export specific  effective  exchange rates.  This is implicit  in our analysis, where we estimate the
' For example,  studies  at fft  Industrial  Credit and Investment  Corporation  of India (ICICI)  show that DP (domestic  profitability)  was greater
than EP (export profitability)  for a sample of exporing finns across different  sectors.  In 1986187,  DP was 13.2% and EP (with export
incentives)  was -0.2%. Between  1978179and  190181. DP was 12.8%  and EP was4.8%. Thesefigures  are from ICI  studies  quoted inWorld
Bank (1990), Vol. I.  The two sets of figures  are not comparable  because  the samples  are different  adi the definitions  oF  profitability  ame  not
identical.
' For example, ihe  July 1991  '...exchange rale adjustmentof  I8 percentin the value of the mpee was designed  to pwvide a substantial  stimulus
to exports (Economic  Survey. 1991-92,  Part L p.  11).
6  REER data has been obtined  from the IMF.
2change in export profitability and the difference between  export and domestic  profitability in the
pre and post reform period, on the basis of a comparative static analysis.
The results indicate that export profitability deteriorated for most export sectors in the dual
exchange rate regime introduced in March 1992.  However, this adverse movement has been
reversed in most of the export sectors with the advent of the unified exchange rate regime in
March 1993.
It should be noted that our attempt is only to calculate the change in profitabilities over
different regimes.  We cannot, for example, say whether domestic profitability exceeds export
profitability  in the  new  regime or  by  how much.  We can,  however,  say that  since the
introduction of the unified exchange rate system, there has been a significant narrowing of the
differential that undoubtedly existed in  the pre-reform period between export and domestic
profitability.  This  is  supported  by  evidence gathered  from  meetings  with  exporters.
Nevertheless, it  would be usefiul if  future  studies attempted to  empirically determine the
difference, if any, between export and domestic profitability in different firms across various
export sectors.  This would be done on the basis of field surveys.
In the following sections of the paper, we will first provide in section II a chronology of
the different export incentives that have characterized India's trade regime.  Section In presents
the analytical model, which first compares export profitability in different regimes and then
analyses the issue of domestic versus export profitability. Section IV presents the results of the
model in the context of the different regimes being examined.  Concluding observations are
offered in section V.  Appendix I presents the data and data sources used in the paper,  and
Appendix II  indicates the possible impact on  the results of  including import tariffs  in  the
3domestic cost function.
II.  CHRONOLOGY OF EXPORT INCENTIVES
India's exporters have had to function within a highly complicated and bureaucratic trade
regime.  The nature of this regime is well documented in the World Bank (1990) study on trade
policy reform.  For an earlier account, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) is an authoritative text.
In this section, we will only summarize those aspects of the trade regime that deal with the
various set-offs and incentives that an exporter is provided.
The biggest rebate  available to  exporters was in the form of the  Cash  Compensatory
Support (CCS), introduced in August 1966.  CCS was designed to compensate exporters for
unrebated indirect taxes on inputs, and to provide some market promotion support for new
products and markets.  CCS rates were product specific, were expressed as a percentage of value
of exports, and typically varied between 10-20% of fob value.
Another rebate was the Duty Drawback, which was introduced in 1954 in order to refund
exporters for duties on  imported inputs arnd for central excise duties paid on  domestically
produced inputs that go into export production.
While the above were in the nature of rebates, the primary incentive  available to exporters
was the special import license which was marketable at a premium. This Replenishment (REP)
license was available to a large proportion of exported products, against which specified inputs
could be inported.  The REP rate was also expressed as a percentage of fob value of exports.
Apart from these, exporters are eligible to import specified materials and components free
of duty under the Advance License scheme.  The International Price Reinbursement  Scheme
4(IPRS) for steel and alloy steel products compensates exporters for the difference between
domestic and international price of these products, and a similar scheme is available for natural
rubber.  Finally, with effect from April  1989, profits from exports were fully exempt from
income tax.
This was the regime in place prior to July 1991  which, for convenience, we shall refer to
as the REP regime.  In July 1991, the rupee was devalued in two stages resulting in an overall
appreciation of  major currencies by  21-23% against the rupee.  Simultaneously, CCS was
abolished, and the REP license was replaced by the system of Exim Scrips, conceptually  similar
to REP but substantially larger in terms of scope and coverage.  As compared to REP rates
varying between 5 and 20% for most products, the Exim Scrip entitlement was a uniform 30%
with a few exceptions. This "Scrip" regime did not last very long, and in March 1992 the Scrip
was abolished and "partial convertibility" of the rupee was introduced in its place.  Under this,
export earings  were converted into rupees at a composite  exchange rate, 60% at the market rate
and 40% at the official rate.  The weighted difference between the market rate and the official
rate constituted an implicit tax on exporters.  All imports, on the other hand, were allowed only
at the market rate.  The regime was further simplified in the 1993/94 Budget, and as of March
1993, the exchange rate was unified, with all imports and exports to be made at the market rate
of exchange.  The salient features of the different regimes are presented in the chart below.
5Chart  1: SALIENT FEATURES OF THE DIFFERENT TRADE REG(IES
REP regime  Dual Exchanee Rate Regime  Unified Exchange Rate Regime
(....  June 1991)  (March 1992-February 1993)  (March 1993  ...... )
1.  Cash  Compensatory  Support  1.  CCS and REP abolished in July  1.  Exchange  rate  unified  and
(CCS).  1991.  market-determined.
2.  Replenishment  license (REP).  2.  Devaluation of the rupee.  2.  Effective devaluation of  rupee
for exporters.
3.  Duty drawback.  3.  Duty drawback.  3.  Duty drawback.
4.  1  nInternational  Price  4.  International  Price  4.  International  Price
Reimbursenment  Scheme  (IPRS).  Reimbursement  Scheme (IPRS).  Reimbursement  Scheme  (IPRS).
5  . Income  tax  exemption  for  5.  Income  tax  exemption  for  5.  Income  tax  exemption  for
exports.  exports.  exports.
6.  Product-specific  CCS and REP.  6.  Generalized  export incentives.  6.  Generalized  export incentives.
7.  Exchange rate Rs. 18/dollar.  7.  Dual exchange rate, roughly  7.  Exchange rate roughly
Rs.28/dollar for exporters and  Rs.31.5ldollar.
Rs.30/dollar for importers.
8.  Fiscal  burden  of  exports
reduced drastically because of
CCS and REP abolition.Inspite of the substantial  downward adjustments  of the rupee, a section of exporters still
want the revival of schemes like the CCS, claiming that they were better off in the earlier
regime (REP).  We shall analyze this claim by means of a simple model that compares export
profitability (EP) as  well as  EP relative to  domestic profitability (DP) in  the  REP  and
dual/unified  exchange rate regimes across various product groups.
m.  THE MODEL 7
Export Profitability
Let us define an incentive function N such that
N =  f (N,, N 2, N3, N4...)
where
N  = the incentive  to export
N 1 = export profitability
N2 = export profitability relative to domestic  profitability
N3 = cost of export-related  red tape (over and above that which is borne for
operating domestically)
N4 =  relative risks of export vis-a-vis  domestic sales
In this paper, we will focus on the profitability  aspects of the incentive  function only, i.e.
on N 1 and N2. N is positively related  to N 1 and N2, and negatively  to N3  and N4. It is worth
rememberingr  that since the new trade regime has led to a decline in red tape, N 3 has declined,
which means that by neglecting N 3 we are underestimating  the incetive to export in the post-
reform period.
7 Se  Sen  (1992). Gupta  (i992) awl Kathuia (1992,1993)  for analysis,  inter alia, of the impact  of the Exin Scrip reginm,  which  has not been
covered  hi this  paper  since it was an intermediate regime that survived only about eight mornhs befonr being replaced by the dual exchange tare
rgime.
7Let Export Profits in the REP regime be given by
Po  =  R+  rpR +  sR-C--Ml-gpM  ....  ......................  (1)
where
P  =  profits in rupees
R  = fob value of exports in rupees
C  = domestic cost of exports in rupees
M  = cost of imported inputs for exports in rupees
r  = REP entitlement (%)
g  = share of total imports obtained  via REP license (%)
p  = premium on REP ($)
s  = CCS entitlement  (%)
Note that  we are  not including schemes such as  Duty Drawback and International Price
Reimbursement Scheme, since we are interested not in export profitability per se but in the
change in export profitability.  We assume that the rates of compensation  provided by such
schemes adjust according  to changes in duties, taxes and prices, so that there is no inter-regime
variation in EP on account  of duty drawback  and IPRS.
With dual or unified exchange rate, Export Profits in rupees are given by PI, and are defined
with reference to the previous regime:
PI  =  wR (1  +E)  - C(1+z) -wM(1  +EM)  - I(u-Z)  . ...................  (2)
where
w  =  some index of world inflation, implying  that dollar prices of Indian
exports and imports rise by that amount
E.,  =  percentage appreciation  in the Re/dollar  rate for exporters
EM =  percentage appreciation  in the Re/dollar  rate for importers
z  =  percentage increase  in costs, proxied by rate of inflation
I  =  interest costs
u  =  percentage increase  in interest rates on pre-shipment  export credit.
Interest costs have been included in the equation for P, because the rate of interest on credit
increased very significantly  (for example, the interest on the most important form of export
credit, pre-shipment export credit,  rose from 7.5%  earlier to  15% in January 1992), and
neglecting them would have meant an overestimate  of PI.  Since interest costs are already
included in domestic costs, only the increase in interest costs over and above the increase in
domestic costs is included as an additional  cost in the term I (u-z).
8Note that it has been assumed that the quantities of import and export remain unchanged in the
two regimes.
If we divide equations (1) and (2) by R, we get
Pt  = 1 +  rp  + s-d-m-gpm  ......  . . . . . (3)
R
and
P,_  =  w(1 +EJ  -d(l+z)  -wm (1+EM) - i(u-z) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  . . . . . . . ..  . (4)
R
where
m =  M/R, the import intensity of exports
d  =  CIR, which we have assumed to be equal to (1-m)
i  =  I/R, interest cost in total exports
Note however that PotR and P, 1R do not represent export profitabilities. Rather,
EP in the REP regime  =  P 0
R+rpR+sR
Export incentives  have been included  in the denominator  since without  these incentives  R is often
less than C+M,  the cost of exports.
EP in the dual/unified regimes  =  P_-
wR(1  +E1)
Then, the change in export profitability (CEP) is given by:
CEP  =  P 1 p
wR (1+E)  R+rpR+sR
or CEP=  PI  - PO
R w(1 +  E)  R(1+rp+s)
Substituting  for PO/R  and PL/R  from (3) and (4), we get
I  Since Revenuc  = Price.  Quaniy, we have assumed  that dte  change in RCvenCu  from exports (or change in cost of imports) emanates  only
from change  in price. This assumption  is one of the limitations  of this kind of staic  anaysis.
9CEP  =  w(l+E,  -d(lz)  - wm(l  -i(uz  - l+rp+s-d-m-gpm  .(5)
w(l +E)  1+rp+s
This is the equation we will use to estimate the change in EP.
Domestic Versus Export Profitability
As before, let Export Profits in the REP regime be
PO  = R+  rpR +  sR-C-M-gpM
If the same goods are sold on the domestic market, profits will be
Pi  =  Ro-C-M-gpM  ......................  (6)
Here we have assumed that the quantity and cost of inputs that enter into domestic production
is the same as those that go into export production.
Then the gap between export and domestic profits is given by 9
Go0Pod  - PO
-Rd-R-rpR-sR  ..........  ..............................  (7)
Then, Go > O if
Rd - R >  rpR +sR
or  R,-R  >  rp  +  s
R
i.e. domestic profits will exceed export profits if the percentage difference between domestic and
export revenues exceeds the  sum of CCS and REP earnings (with CCS and REP earnings
expressed in percentage fonm).
Similarly, in the regime of dual or unified exchange rate, Export Profits are
PI  =  wR (1+EJ)  -C(1+z)  -wM(l+Em)  - I(u-z)
The same goods if sold domestically will fetch profits
'The  expression in equation  (7) overesimures  the gap between  expon and domestic profits, since in the equation  for export profits we have not
allowed for duty drawback. IPRS and also the income tax exemption  on export profits.  However, as in the previous section, we are not
incrcsted in the gap per se but in thc change in the gap i.e. GJ4,G.
10Pld  =  Rt4 -C(1 +Z)  -WM(1  +EM)  - I(U-Z)  I  ......................  (8)
The gap between export and domestic profits is
I=  Pld -P
=  Rld  - wR(1  +E.)  ..........................  (9)
G 1 >  0 if
Rld  >  wR  (l  +E)
or  BR,. >  w  (1+E)
R
i.e. domestic profits will exceed export profits if the ratio of domestic revenue to original export
revenue exceeds the index of increase in rupee realization of exporters.
A sound export policy must attempt to reduce anti-export  bias by narrowing the differential
between export and domestic profits i.e. Go  should be greater than GI.
Go >  G 1 if
RO -R -rpR -sR -RId +  WR(l+EJ  >  0
This simplifies to
Rid  -Rd  c WR(l+E)  - R-rpR-SR ............................  (10)
or  RIH-  Rod  <  w(1+EJ)-1-rp-s . ......................  .......  (11)
R
The left hand side of (10) is the increase in revenue from domestic sales, and the right hand
side is the revenue increase from export sales if the same goods are sold abroad.  Since we are
assuming that costs are the same in both domestic as well as export sales, the condition that the
profit differential should reduce is identical  to the condition  that the revenue differential should
narrow.  Ideally, we would like to be able to  estimate inequality (11), which is a deflated
version of (10).  However, the LHS of (11) cannot be calculated  since it involves a knowledge
of revenues, and therefore prices.  One possible solution is to  assume that the increase in
revenues in absolute terms is equal to the increase in costs (i.e. prices are  increased by the
9 Note that we are comparing  absolute  values  of the gaps between  export and domestic  profits.  Owing lo inflation,  comparng absolute  values
of G. and G, underesdmaies  the declne in bias: a deflated G, will obviously  be less dun G,.  If 0  >  G, is satisfied,  then Go >  deflated  G,
will also be satisfied.
11amount that costs increase, assuming  quantities  are unchanged).' 0
Thus, let the absolute cost increase  between  the REP and dual/unified  exchange  rate regime
be given by
Y  =  C(1 +z)  +  wM(l +EM) +  I(u-z)-(C+M +  gpM)
=  Cz + wM (1+Em) + I (u-z)-M-gpM
Then,  Y=dz  +  wm (1  +EM) + i (u-z)-m-gpm ....  ...  (12)
R
Based on our assumption that the revenue increase is equal to the cost increase, we can
substitute  the left-hand  side of (11)  by (12), and get a condition  for narrowing of the differential
between export and domestic  profits i.e.
dz + wm (1+Em) + i (u-z)-m-gpm <  w(l+EJ-l-rp-s  . (13)
In (13), the left hand side is a proxy for increase  in revenue  on domestic  sales, and the right
hand side is the increase in revenue from export sales if the same product was sold abroad.
Both sides are deflated by R, the original export revenue.  We use equation (13) to estimate
CEDP (the change in the difference between export and domestic profitability).  CEDP is
calculated as the left hand side of equation (13) minus the right hand side, and if CEDP is
negative, it implies a decline in the anti-export  bias.
As mentioned  earlier, we have  assumed-that  import  costs for domestic and export sales are
identical.  In fact, duties have to be paid on imports for domestic production.  Whether this
makes a difference  to total import cost (since  tariff cuts are countered  by rupee devaluation)  and
to the CEDP exercise is shown in Appendix II.  As we shall see, its inclusion does not make
a material difference to the results in Table 1.
IV.  THE RESULTS
Simulation Assumptions
We have employed  four different sets of assumptions  to generate our simulation  results.
Simulation I:
The basic data that we have used is described in the Appendix. Data details and sources
"'This assumption  means that there would be a marginal decline in domestic  profitability  (profits/revenue),  since
revenue would increase while profits would remain  constant.
12include those for CCS and REP rates, import intensity, inflation rates, interest costs, exchange
rates, world inflation and interest rates.  This  is used to generate the results with standard
assumptions, as shown in columns 1-4 -of Table 1.
Simulation II;
Many exporters complained  that buyers wanted to share the benefits of devaluation, leading
to pressure on exporters to reduce dollar export prices.  While this may have happened in some
cases, a more plausible assumption is tlhat  dollar prices were unchanged rather than reduced,
which presumably compensated exporters for the loss of CCS and REP.  All other assumptions
are standard, and the results are set out in columns 5-8 of Table 1.
Simulation m:
We have used balance sheet data for firms.  The implicit  assumption  is that import intensity
is the same for domestic and export sales.  Normally, however, exports require a higher dose
of imported inputs on account of more exacting quality standards as well as variation in demand
pattens.  We have therefore employed higher import intensities 11  in the simulation exercises
in columns 9-12 of Table 1, alongwith the previous assumption of unchanged dollar prices.
Simulation IV:
Finally, we focussed on domestic inflation. During our survey of exporting firms, several
complained that the input cost increase they faced was much higher than indicated by the WPI.
We attempted to judge the sensitivity  of the results to a rate of inflation 25 % higher than the one
used earlier.  The results with higher inflation  rate are shown in columns 13-16 of Table 1.  The
other assumptions are all the same as in the previous sirnulation  for columns 13 and 14, i.e.
"The  higher values of import intensity  are shown in Appendix  Table 1, and based on Exim Bank  (1991) and Gupta (1992).  Gupta's  data is
based on share of REP licenses in exports, which  probably  over-estmates  the  actual inport inlensity.
13unchanged dollar prices and higher import intensity. For columns 15 and 16, we have allowed
for a small dollar price rise of 5  % instead of a constant dollar price, since we are looking at a
much longer time span in the change to the unified rate regime.
The Results
CEP in Table 1 refers to the difference (in percentage  points) in export profitability between
the REP and Dual exchange rate regime.  CEDP is an indicator of  the change in relative
attractiveness of  the domestic and export markets: a minus sign indicates that exports have
become relatively more attractive. 12 The absolute values of CEP should be taken as indicative:
we would place greater stress on the direction of change and the relative magnitudes between
sectors.  In the case of CEDP, we interpret th.e  figures only in terms of their direction of change
and relative magnitudes across sectors, rather than in terms of their absolute magnitudes.  In
each set of simulations, the first two columns refer to the move from REP to dual exchange rate
regime, and the next two columns refer to the move from REP to the unified exchange rate.
regime.  For the purpose of our analysis, we have chosen June 1991, September 1992 and June
1993 as representative  months for the REP, dual exchange rate and unified exchange rate regime
respectively.  Thus, the shift from REP to dual exchange rate regime in our analysis is the
change between June 1991 and September 1992.  Similarly, the shift from REP to the unified
exchange rate regime is the change between June 1991 and June 1993.
The results of Simulation I (columns 1-2) show that in the move from REP to dual rate
regime, most sectors see a gain in EP, and a favorable movement (i.e. a negative sign) for
CEDP.  In textiles, and sub-sector (b) of engineering goods, EP declines.  CEDP nevertheless
2 It is the increase in costs of selling  in the domcstic market  niinus Ehe  increase in export revenue if dte  sane product was sold overseas i.e.
the left hand  side of equation  (13) minus the right hand side.
14is negative in the latter case, since domestic revenue increases less than export revenue; CEDP
is positive for textiles, which means that domestic costs (prices) in the textile sector have risen
faster than export profits. On the other hand, once the exchange rate was unified (columns  3-4),
all sectors gain substantially in tenns of EP, and CEDP is also large and negative. This implies
significant improvement in export incentives after unification of the exchange rate.
Normnally,  one may expect some resistance to dollar price increases in the aftermath of a
devaluation, at least for a while.  With dollar prices unchanged (columns 5-6), Simulation II
shows that a little over a year after the devaluation  of July 1991, most export sectors with the
exception of agriculture (b) witnessed a decline in EP (between  June 1991 and September 1992).
CEDP is negative, as expected, for agriculture (b), and also for chemicals et al and leather
products.  Thus  vith dollar prices unchanged instead of rising by 8.6% between June 1991 and
September 1992, the results change dramatically. Theoretically, dollar export prices could have
been reduced (in which case EP would have declined still further in the dual exchange rate
regime), kept constant, or raised after the devaluation. If they are reduced or kept constant, EP
would decline.  We see Simulation  II results as more plausible than Simulation  I, at least for the
move from REP to dual exchange rate regime.
As in Simulation  I, the adverse movement in CEP and CEDP noticed in the shift from REP
to dual rate regime in Simulation II reverses itself in the unified rate regime (columns 7-8).
Only engineering (b), carpets and textiles continue to see a decline in EP, but CEDP is negative
(favorable) for all but textiles.
Simulations Im  and IV embody stricter assumptions  on most parameters than earlier.  In the
REP to dual rate regime shift, EP deteriorates further with these assumptions.  In the REP to
15unified rate regime, Simulation  III shows a reversal of this decline for most sectors except
engineering, plastic goods, textiles and carpets.  Simulation IV results are  very similar to
Simulation  III (the higher cost inflation  assumption  is neutralized  by the 5 % dollar price increase
assumption, as compared to Simulation  III).
It  needs to  be noted that the assumptions on inflation rates and  import intensities in
Simulation IV may be rather severe.  If we relax the severity of these assumptions slightly
(which would render them more plausible), then all sectors except engineering  goods (b) would
see a positive change in EP.13
The other noteworthy aspect of the results is the relative levels of change in EP across
sectors.  The largest increases in EP in the unified rate regime arise in agriculture, leather and
chemicals, and the lowest (or negative) increases in engineering, carpets and textiles.  In
general, sectors which enjoyed low incentives in the REP regime gained the most in the post-
reform period.'4 This is  particularly true  of a  large  variety of  agriculture products and
minerals and ores, which received very little export incentives in the pre-reform period.
Finally, it is necessary to comment on one assumption of the CEDP model.  We have
assumed that the increase in domestic revenze is equal to the increase in costs.  In reality,
however,  the  very  low  growth of  industrial production in  1992193 (1.8%)  and  1993/94
(estimated  at 4%) has meant that there has been a downward  pressure on industrial  profitability,
13  In colurnn 15, if inflation  (z) for carpets is 22% instead  cf the very high figure of 34%, or if import  intensity  is 12%  instead of the simlarly
high figureof25% andz  =  27.1% insteadof34%.thenc-ange  inEP is positive. Similarly.  in dhecaseoftextiles, ifz =  20% instead oF33%,
or if z = 26.6% (i.e. the aclual rate used in columns  3-4. 7-8. and 11-12)  and  i  = 10% instead  of the high rate of 25%, then the change in
EP is positive. For engineering  goods (a), all it requires  for the EP change to he positive  is for z to be 20% instead  of 22.3%.  It is only in
engineering  goods (b) that the assumptions  in column  15 (z = 22.3 %, m = 30  %, w = 1.05)  do nDt  seem unduly  unrealistic. Even if we reduce
z and m to 20% each, EP change  is still negative. It is on'y if in addinon  w = 1.09 that EP change turs  positive.
T
4
*he  correlation  coefficients  between  CEP and CCS are -0.75 (REP to dual rate) and -0.87 (REP to unified rate).
16TABLE  1:  CHANGES  IN EXPORT  PROFITABILITY  AND  EXPORT  RELATIVE  TO
DOMESTIC  PROFITABIL'  ITY:
SIMULATION  RESULTS  UNDER  DIFFERENT  ASSUMPTIONS
REP 1o  dual  REP to unified  REP to dual  REP to unified  REP  to  dual  REP to unified  REP to dual
exchan rate  cxchan  rate  exchan  rate  exchange  rate  exchn  rate  exchange  rate  exchange  rame
CEP  CEDP  CEP  CEDP  CEP  CEDP  CEP  CEDP  CEP  CEDP  CEP  CEDP  CEP  CEDP
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14
Engineering  goods
a)  Normal  incentives  2.3  -7.7  10.3  -24.5  -3.9  2.8  2.4  -8.3  -8.3  3.7  -1.7  -2.0  -9.9  10.9
b) Very  high incentives  -1.9  -1.5  6.0  -18.3  -8.2  9.0  -1.8  -2.1  -12.6  14.9  -6.0  4.2  -14.1  17.1
Chemicals  & Allied  Products  4.6  -1.0  13.1  -27.9  -1.7  -0.1  5.4  -12.1  -5.2  4.7  1.9  -6.7  -7.0  7.2
Plastic  goods  2.5  -7.2  10.9  -24.0  -3.1  0.2  3.9  -9.7  -7.8  8.3  -0.6  -2.7  -9.2  10.3
Finished  Leather  & goods  6.0  -12.9  14.6  -31.1  -0.2  -2.3  7.0  -14.8  -1.7  -0.2  5.4  -12.5  -3.4  0.2
SpostsgoWds  0.5  -4.9  10.7  -24.8  6.4  6.1  2.3  -8.0  -7.9  8.2  0.6  -54  -10.9  12.2
Agr. & processed  food
a) Higher  incentives  2.2  -7.1  13.3  -28.4  -4.7  3.9  5.0  -11.6  -6.1  5.8  3.3  -9.0  -9.2  10.0
b) Low incentives  11.8  -18.1  22.9  -39.4  4.8  -7.1  14.5  -22.6  3.5  -5.2  12.9  -20.0  0.3  -1.0
Textiles  4.3  2.0  4.7  -15.3  -11.2  12.6  -3.7  0.1  -13.5  15.7  -5.9  4.3  -16.1  19.3
Handicrafts
a) Brasswar4  0.8  -5.5  12.0  -27.6  6.0  5.5  4.0  -10.7  -9.2  9.9  0.2  -4.9  -11.4  12.9
b) Carpets  2.5  -8.1  6.2  -17.8  -4.0  2.9  -2.5  -0.9  -7.9  8.3  -5.2  3.2  -9.8  10.8
Notes:
1) CEP is change in export  profirahility,  and  CEDP is change  in the difference  betwecn  cxport  and  domcstic  profitability.
2) CEP figures  are in percentage  points  (for example,  CEP would  be 2.3 if, say, EP rosc  omrn  15%  in the  REP regime  lo 17.3%  in the dual razc  regime).
3) CEDP  figures  are differences  In absolute  values  divided  by a common  denoninator,  and the resultant  value Is then multiplied  by 100.
4) For simulation  assumptions,  riefr to text.and domestic revenues may in fact have increased less than costs.  Through our assumption, we
have therefore made the domestic market look more attractive than it in fact is in the post-reform
regimes.  Thus, in cases where CEDP is marginally positive in our simulations, it is possible
that in reality it may be negative i.e. favorable for exports.
V.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
We noted an adverse movement  in EP and CEDP in the dual exchange  rate regime for
most export sectors.  This is true irrespective  of the severity of assumptions  on import intensity
and inflation rates.  As long as dollar prices are unchanged in the period between the REP and
dual rate regimes (June 1991 to September 1992 in this study), export incentives are adversely
affected for most sectors.
The dual exchange rate regime was in place from March 1992 to February 1993. Over this
period, and particularly until the end of January 1993, there was an erosion in the real effective
exchange rate  for exporters: the composite nominal exchange rate changed very  little,  and
inflation gradually eroded the benefit to exporters.  Our analysis has shown that most exporters
were worse off in September 1992 vis-a-vis June 1991, and this position would have worsened
over the following months.  The Government attempted to redress the situation by unifying the
exchange rate as  of  March  1993, which, if we compare the  (exporters') exchange rate  of
September 1992 with the unified rate of June 1993, amounts to an effective  devaluation  of nearly
10% in the value of the rupee.
As a result,  the  adverse  movement in  export incentives in the  dual rate  regime  has
reversed  itself in most cases in the uniied  rate regime.  With standard assumptions, this is
18true across all sectors. Even with rather severe assumptions  on inflation rates, import intensities
and dollar price increases, EP declines only in the case of engineering goods, textiles, and
carpets.  If we relax the severity of the assumptions slightly, then even for the cases above, the
EP change would be positive.  The only exception to this is engineering goods (b).
The results are generally supported by actual data collected from firms in the field.  In the
dual exchange rate regime, a large number of exporters in different sectors complained of a
decline  in EP,  particularly in  the case  of some engineering and  textile exporters.  As  it
happened, the dual rate regime coincided with significant recession in some of India's major
markets, with the result that there was great pressure on many Indian exporters not to increase
and to even reduce their dollar prices.  The exchange  rate unification was an appropriate solution
to the erosion in EP, with the effective  depreciation of the mpee amounting  to nearly 10%.  This
was confirmed in recent meetings with exporting firms, most of whom agreed that EP had
increased subsantially  as compared to the dual rate regime and even as compared to the REP
regime.  The exception was some engineering exporters who said that they enjoyed higher EP
under the REP regime.
Even for  those exporters who have suffered a  decline in  EP,  there  is  an  important
mitigating factor.  The abolition of CCS and REP licenses has ended the extended periods that
exporters had to wait in order to collect their CCS dues and REP licenses.  This, as well as
gradual improvement in export-related bureaucracy, lower import duties, removal of import
restrictions for most inputs and capital goods, has made it easier for the exporter to concentrate
on exporting and imparted greater flexibility to his functioning. To the extent that these factors
are  operative, they make an important contribution to  reducing the  bias against exporting
19activity.  '5
Our analysis  has demonstrated  that there are circumstances  under which a decline  in EP
need  not result in a fall in the incentive  to export. This  happens  when  the relative  decline  in DP
is more than the decline  in EP'. For example,  there was a decline  in EP in the case of (high
incentive)  engineering  goods  in the switch  from the  REP to dual rate regime,  but a simultaneous
decline  in DP ensured  that there was no decline  in the incentive  to export.
Moreover, although  we have compared  the incentives  across regimes  using  June 1991  as
a base, therc is a case for using  an earlier base.  The export  policies  that were being followed
in June 1991,  following  the onset  of the foreign  exchange  crisis  in the last quarter  of 1990,  were
not sustainable,  partly because  they involved  a large measure  of budgetary support.  If we
compare the export incentives  prior to the run on foreign exchange  reserves, say, in
September  1990,  with  September  1992-,  then  there is an unambiguous  increase  in EP across
all sectors.16 Thus, if we use September  1990 as a base in our analysis,  there would be an
unambiguous  increase  in E1?  between  the REP to dual rate regime for all sectors, and a very
signiicant increase  in the move  from Rep  to the unified  rate regime.
To be sure, there are many  influences  on exports  other  than profitability,  such as domestic
and intemadinal demand,  relative  prices  and so on.  However,  it is a truism that there can be
no sustained  export  success  if there is a policy  bias  against  exports. This  policy  bias is reflected
in the domestic  market  being  relatively  more attractive  than the export market. Recent  policies
in India  have sought  to reduce  and eventually  eliminate  this anti-export  bias. Another  bias  that
"See Section  m where we defined the incentive  function.
"For  example.  in te  case of engineering  goods (a). the  incrr.se in EPl  between  September  1990 and June 1991 is as much as 8.5 percentage
points even with no increase  in dollar prices.  The main  source of this increase  was the 16%  depreciion  in the value of the mepee  over this
period.  Other  sectors also show simibr orders of increase  (for more  details  an this. see Kathudria  (1993)).
20existed earlier was the one against primary or unprocessed goads vis-a-vis manufactured ones.
The elimination  of product-specific  incentives  has removed this bias.  Overall, the regime has
moved doser to its eventual goal of being neutral  between import substitution  and export
promotion, and this is reflected in a significant  change in the attitude of India's corporate sector
towards exports.
The policies have received an early vindication. It is more than a coincidence that the
export surge in  fiscal 93/94 has been mainly led by sectors which have witnessed the
greatest increase  in export profitability.  In April-July 1993, products with year-on-year  export
growth rates in dollar tenns in excess of 30 percent included plantations, agriculture and allied
products, minerals and ores, chemicals and gems and jewelry.  As we have seen, most of these
also happen to be products which witnessed the largest increase in their export profitabilities
between the  REP  and unified rate  regimes.  Similarly, for April-September 1993, broad
disaggregation  of exports reveals growth rates of 38 percent for agriculture and allied products,
25 percent for minerals, petroleum and others, and a lower rate of 17 percent for manufactured
goods, which is in keeping with the re-alignment  of incentives.
A caveat is also in order.  Given the stability of the nominal exchange rate at about Rs.31.4
to  the dollar since March 1993, and with inflation running at 7-9%, there has been a gradual
increase in recent months in the real effective exchange rate (39 in April 1993  to 41 in October
1993).  Moreover, the Reserve Bank of India has had to intervene  actively in order to prevent
the rupee from appreciating. With exports being top priority, the REER will bear watching and
monitoring by the Reserve Bank.
21'APPENDIX I
TH  DATA
Appendix  Tables  1 and 2 show  the actual  data that we have  used in our calculations.  We
have  divided  all exports  into eight broad sectors,  based on the classification  in the CCS tables.
For each of these  sectors,  and in some  cases  sub-sectors,  we have  collected  data on CCS  rates,
Rep  rates, import  intensity,  inflation  rates, and interest  costs  as a share  of sales (Appendix  Table
1).  Apart from these, we have common  variables  such as the exchange  rate change, index of
world inflation,  and interest  rates (Appendix  Table  2).
The data  on import  intensity  and interest  costs is in turn based  on an RBI  study  of 622 large
companies  (RBI  Bulletin,  May 1990),  see Appendix  Table  3.  CCS and Rep rates are based on
average/modal  values  of these rates within  each sector. For CCS, we have, in addition,  data
on actual  disbursement  rates in 1983/84,  from the Husain  Committee  (1984)  Report. This has
been  used wherever  possible. For the inflation  rate, we  have in most  cases  used the percentage
change in the Wholesale  Price Index of the major input in each sector (see Appendix  Table 4
for the basic  data). Wherever  the classification  in the RBI  data  does not match  directly  with the
classification  we have  used, we have  made  ad-hoc  assumptions.
We have divided some sectors such as engineering  and agriculture  into two sub-sectors
since the range  of incentives  within  these  was very high. In engineering,  there was tle top end
category  such as motor vehicles  and NC and  CNC machine  tools  which received  20% CCS  and
20% REP.  Most other engineering  goods  were eligible  for a lower level of support,  and we
have chosen  a value  of 14.8% CCS  (actual  disbursement  rate in 1983/84),  and a modal  rate of
15% REP.  In agriculture,  incentives  were generally  low or non-existent,  and we have chosen
22two CCS rates of 0  and 10%.  Within handicrafts, which is a very heterogenous group of
products, we have picked on the two largest categories - brassware and woollen handknotted
carpets.  The REP rate for brassware was 40%.
We have assumed a common Rep. premium (p) of 20%, and the share of imports obtained
via the Rep. license (g) 10%.  Although these rates vary across sectors, the results obtained are
not very sensitive to variations in the rates.  Moreover, such data is not readily available.  We
have therefore assumed constant values for p and g.  Appendix  Table 5 shows the other common
variables on which Appendix Table 2 is based.
23APPENDIX  TABLE 1: THE DATA
DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS USED IN CALCULATIONS
(aLL figures  in  percentages)
m  2  z  i
Inport  InfLetion, InfLation,  Interest
m  Intensity  Rep  to  Rep  to  cost
r  Import  higher  dual  unified  to  totat
Sector  Rep.rate  CCS rate intensity  value  rate  rate  revenue
Engineering
Goods  i)  15.0  14.8  8.6  30.0  13.3  17.9  5.0
ii)  20.0  20.0  8.6  30.0  13.3  17.9  5.0
Chemicals  £
ALlied  Products  12.5  9.8  11.1  30.0  15.5  19.1  5.0
Plastic  goods  12.5  9.6  20.0  45.0  15.5  19.1  5.0
Finished  Leather
& teather  goods  17.5  11.3  8.0  15.0  11.1  14.1  5  g
Sports  goods  15.0  12.6  5.0  15.0  20.5  21.9  5.0
Agriculture  &
Processed  Food i)  15.0  10.0  5.0  14.5  20.9  20.8  5.0
ii)  10.0  0.0  5.0  14.5  20.9  20.8  5.0
Textiles  15.0  15.0  8.8  25.0  21.5  26.6  8.1
Handicrafts
1) Brassuare  40.0  10.0  5.0  23.5  17.2  16.2  5.0
ii)  Carpets  20.0  14.0  5.0  25.0  14.3  27.1  5.0
Notes:
1)  Figures  underlined  are  assumptions  based on related  data  in  Appendix TabLe 3.  Exim  Bank
(1991)  and other  information.
2)  The rate  of  infLation,  z,  is  in  most  cases  the  increase  in  the  WholesaLe  Price  Index for  the
major  input  in  the  respective  sectors.  These rates  pertain  to  basic  metals  and alloys  (for
engineering  goods),  a weighted average of  basic  heavy inorganic  ard  organic  chemicals  in
the  ratio  2:1  (for  chemicals,  as  well  as  for  pLastic  goods),  footwear  western  type  (for
Leather  products),  other  rubber  and pLastic  goods (sports  goods),  food  articles,  primary
(for  agriculture  and processed  food),  cotton  yarn  (textiles),  brass  sheets  and strips
(brassware),  woolten  yarn  (carpets).  For  leather,  we have used the  UPI  for  footwear,  in
the  absence of  a  credible  infLation  rate  for  raw Leather.  Most carpets  are  woollen,  so we
have used the  UPI  for  woollen  yarn.
3)  The higher  values  of  import  intensity  are  used  as  an  alternative  in  our  simuLation  exercises.
Sources:  Appendix TabLes 3 and 4,  Hussain Comnittee  (19B4),  Kumari (1991),  and Gupta (1992).
APPENDIX  TABLE 2
VALUES OF COMMON PARAMETERS
REP  to  Dual Exchange Rate  REP  to Uniied  Exchange Rate
w  1.086  1.119
E.  0.350  0.493
E.  0.430  0.493
u  1.000  0.733
p  0.200  0.200
g  0.100  0.100
APPENCIX TABLE 3
24SECTORAL  IMPORT  INTENSITIES  1958-89
(Rs.  crores  unless  otherwise  stated)
TOTAL  CAPITAL  IMPORTS  SALES NET  IMPORT
INDUSTRY  IMPORTS  GOODS  LESS  CG  OF EXCISE  INTENSITY  INTEkEST
Tea  15.5  0.7  14.8  1183  1.251  3.61
Sugar  0.9  0.5  0.4  412  0.101  4.8X
Tobacco  7.7  1.9  5.8  628  0.92Z  5.31
Cotton/blended  text  316.9  20.1  296.8  3385  8.771  8.11
Jute  textiLes  t0.1  0.3  9.8  149  6.581  2.9X
Silk  and rayon text  17.8  3.5  14.3  773  1.85X  6.51
Alumninum  30.1  7.1  23.0  692  3.32X  4.01
Engineering  of  which  1153.3  103.4  1049.9  12203  8.60X  5.0X
Motor vehicLes  274.4  25.8  248.6  3342  7.44X  5.01
Elec  machinery,app-
liances,apparatus  250.8  19.8  231.0  2451  9.42X  4.6X
Mach. other  than
tpt.  and etec.  335.6  30.2  305.4  3661  8.341  5.51
Foundries and engg.
workshops  191.4  3.3  188.1  1273  14.781  4.8X
Ferrous/non-ferrous
metaL products  85.6  22.1  63.5  1035  6.14X  5.41
ChemicaLs  of  which  1071.0  49.8  1021.2  9230  11.061  5.11
Med. end  pharm.  169.9  5.7  164.2  2059  7.97X  3.0X
Paints  and varnishes  41.0  6.4  34.6  386  8.96X  3.8X
Basic  indl.  chem  738.9  35.4  703.5  5109  13.77X  6.71
of  which  chem  ferts  442.2  9.2  433.0  1888  22.93X  8.31
Cement  36.5  17.8  18.7  1662  1.13X  6.4X
Rubber and rubber pdts  198.6  5.1  193.5  2219  8.72X  3.8%
Paper and paper pdts.  151.1  5.7  145.4  1132  12.84X  8.0X
Construction  3.0  1.9  1.1  291  0.381  5.41
Elec.  gen.  and supply  39.1  32.9  6.2  1907  0.331  6.4U
Trading  44.4  2.5  41.9  998  4.201  2.7X
Shipping  0  0  0  320  0.OOX  10.42
TOTAL  3630.1  320.7  3309.4  44555  7.43%  5.32
Notes:  Interest  Costs are showin  as a sl,are  of  net  sales.
Source:RBI Bulletin  May 1990
25APPENDIX  TABLE  4
INFLATION RATES  FOR SELECTED  PRODUCTS
Change  Change
WholesaLe  Pr.  Index  in  Price  (1)  in  Price  tX)
June91  Sept92 June93  June91-  June91-  increased  by




Basic  metals,  alloys  snd  metal  pdts  229.1  257.4  266.7  12.35 16.41  15.44 20.52
Basic  metals  and  alLoys  214.9  243.5  253.3  13.31 17.87  16.64 22.34
MetaL  products  246.9  272.0  283.5  10.17 14.82  12.71  18.53
Machinery  and  machine  tools  197.2  227.5  232.3  15.37 17.80  19.21 22.25
Transport  equipment and  parts  193.8  214.2  218.6  10.53 12.80  13.16  16.00
CHEMICALS  AND  ALLIED  PRODUCTS
Chemicals  and  chemical  products  157.6  184.8  202.3  17.26  28.36  21.57 35.45
Basic heavy inorganic  chemicals  210.1  250.4  259.8  19.18  23.66  23.98  29.57
Basic  heavy  organic  chemicals  117.4  126.9 129.0  8.09  9.88  10.11 12.35
Dyestuffs  and  indigo  178.9  219.1  224.5  22.47  25.49  28.09 31.86
Drugs and medicine  156.8  169.3  175.9  7.97 12.18  9.96  15.23
Non-metallic  mineral  products  215.0  231.6  242.8  7.72  12.93  9.65  16.16
PLASTIC  GOODS
Plastic  products  189.3  194.4  194.2  3.24  3.13  4.05  3.92
other  rubber and  plastic  pdts  163.3 196.8  199.1 20.51  21.92  25.64  27.40
FINISHED  LEATHER  AND  LEATHER  GOODS
Leather  and Leather products  240.1  223.5  232.5  -6.91  -3.17  -8.64  -3.96
Sheep  and goat  skin  192.4  118.7  126.5  -38.31  -34.25  -47.88  -59.85
SoLe  leather  251.1  253.1  264.7  0.80  5.42  1.00  6.77
Footwear  western  type  283.8  315.3  323.8  11.10  14.09  13.87  17.62
SPORTS  GOODS
Wood  and wood  products  159.3  287.1  345.1  80.23  116.64  100.28  125.35
AGRICULTURE  AND  PROCESSED  FOOD
Food  articles  (primary)  227.4  275.0 274.8 20.93  20.84  26.17  26.06
Fruits  and  vegetables  252.1  280.5  284.4  11.27 12.81  14.08  16.02
Fish  241.1  267.9  291.5  11.12  20.90  13.89  26.13
Tea  299.7  278.6  361.2  -7.04  20.52  -8.80  25.65
Non-food  articles  217.0  230.6 228.5  6.27  5.30  7.83  6.62
Food  products  (manufactured)  199.6  223.0 243.8  11.72  22.14  14.65  27.68
Packed tea  277.9  302.1  300.2  8.71  8.02  10.89  10.03
TEXTILES
Fibres  227.8  220.8  212.5  -3.07  -6.72  -3.84  -8.40
Raw  cotton  219.6  217.8 213.1 -0.82 -2.96  -1.02  -3.70
TextiLes  180.2  198.1  209.3  9.93  16.15  12.42  20.19
Cotton  textiles  189.1  212.5 222.4 12.37 17.61  15.47 22.01
Cotton  yarn  208.3  253.0 263.6 21.46 26.55  26.82  33.19
HANDICRAFTS  AND  CARPETS
Uoollen  yarn  200.9  229.6 255.4  14.29  27.13  17.86 33.91
Brass sheets  and strips  250.7  293.7  291.4  17.15  16.23  21.44  20.29
FUEL,  POWER,  LIGHT  AND  LUBRICANTS  189.5  224.5  251.8  18.47  32.88  23.09  41.09
Source:  Derived  from  CMIE  (1993,  1993.,  1992)
26APPENDIX  TABLE 5
VARIABLES COMMON ALL SECTORS
Sept.  1990  June 1991  Sept.1992  June  1993
Exchange  rate  for  exportere  17.87  21.06  28.43  (35.0)  31.44  (49.3)
Exchange  rate  for  importersb  17.87  21.06  30.12  (43.0)  31.44  (49.3)
WorLd  Price  Index'  153.4  165.9  180.2  (8.6)  185.6  (11.9)
Interest  Rate  (2)d  7.5  7.5  15.0  (100.0)  13.0  (73.3)
Notes:
Figures  in  parentheses  are  percentage  change  over  June  1991.
a.  Rs./dollar,  official  rates  until  June  1991. The  rate  for  September  1992  is  weighted  with  602
valued  at  the  mrket rate,  and  402  at  the  official  rate.  The  June  1993  rate  is  the  market  price.
b.  Rs./dolLar,  official  rates  until  June  1991,  market  rates  thereafter.
c.  This  is  the  Consumer  Price  Index  for  DeveLoping  Countries  of  Asia  as  given  in  the  IMF's  International
Financial  Statistics.  The  figure  for  June  1993  has  been  extrapolated  from  data  available  upto
February  1993.
d.  This  is  the  interest  rate  on  pre-shipment  rupee  export  credit  for  a  period  upto  180  days.
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INCLUSION OF IMPORT TARIFF-RELATED COSTS IN THE CEDP EXERCISE
In our simulation  exercise, we have assumed  that import costs for domestic and export
sales are identical.  In practice, duties have to be paid on imports imported for domestic
production, whereas on export production such inputs are obtained duty-free (via advance
license or duty drawback).  Since tariff rates have come down over the three regimes (REP,
dual exchange rate and unified exchange rate), one would expect a decline in costs for
domestic production.  However, the tariff reduction is mitigated  by the fall in the value of
the rupee.  If we were to include the impact of tariffs on domestic costs, the re-worked
equation (11) would be:
-&  <  w(l+E)-l-rp-s+tl  wm (1+EM)  - t0m .......  (lla)
RI
where t;  =  average tariffs in the regime i, to being normalized  to 1.
If the average tariff in intermediate  goods in the REP regime is 1, it is roughly 0.78 in
the dual rate regime and 0.52 in the unified rate regime.  The expression  t,wm(l+EM)-tOm  is
equivalent to import tariff-related increase or decrease in cost of domestic production.  If the
expression is positive, it implies an increase in tariff-related  domestic costs, and results in a
corresponding  increase in the RHS of (lla).  This would favor EP over DP.  On the other
hand, if the expression is negative, it means a decline in import-tariff related domestic costs,
which would reduce the RHS of (lla)  and favor DP over EP.
28In general, it is found that the expression  is always positive in the REP to dual rate
regime shift, irrespective  of the value of m, and even if w= 1.  With m varying between 0.1
and 0.2, and w between 1 and 1.086, the expression  (multiplied  by 100) varies between 1.1
and 4.2.  This will make little difference to the sign of CEDP in Table 1 in most cases - if
CEDP is negative, it will become  more negative; it is only in a handful of cases where
CEDP is marginally positive (plastics, column 6, leather, column 14) that CEDP can become
Tiegative.
In the REP to unified rate regime, the calculated  expression is always negative, meaning
that import tariffs, which declined nearly 50%, have outweighed  the effect of the fall in the
rupee value.  However, the value of the calculated  expression, which varies between -1.3
and -4.4 for m varying between 0.1 and 0.2 and w between 1 and 1.119, is too small relative
to the values of CEDP in the relevant columns in Table 1.  It is only if CEDP is marginally
negative in Table 1 as for carpets and engineering  goods (b) in column 8, and engineering
goods (a) in column 12, that the sign of CEDP can tum marginally positive.
Note, however, that this is a static analysis, and possibly admissible  in the short period
that we are considering. In the medium to long-run, however, there will be a decline not
just in tariffs (and therefore in input prices) for domestic  production, but also in output prices
owing to pressure from imports.  This factor will need to be taken into account before
making longer-run projections  from the CEDP analysis.
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